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ABSTRACT:
Characteristics of R&D laboratories are reviewed with emphasis
on Federal laboratories. Dimensions of the scientist-laboratory
interface and their potential relationships to R&D products are
examined. The purpose, need, and approaches to evaluation of
laboratory effectiveness are reviewed with emphasis on advisory
panels and criteria for evaluation. Recommendations are made
for peer-rating the utility of Navy personnel research programs
from the standpoint of consumer and producer. Recommendations
are also made for a systematic analysis of the internal environ-
ment of the Navy's personnel research laboratories as a basis
for management decisions and programs.
This research was supported in part by the Personnel Research
Division, Bureau of Naval Personnel, through Project Order No.





This report deals with a research project between the sponsoring
activity, the Personnel Research Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel,
and the Naval Postgraduate School. The topics examined in this report are:
(1) Current procedures and recommended, improved procedures for evaluating
the performance and effectiveness of the Navy Personnel Research and Devel-
opment Laboratory and the Navy Personnel and Training Research Laboratory
and (2) administrative and managerial practices for encouraging greater
application of new research techniques and procedures in the aforementioned
laboratories. Subsequent reports will deal with the further development
and application of evaluative procedures, effectiveness measures, and organ-
izational principles for personnel and training research.
The study was performed under the auspices of Capt. G. F. Britner,
Division Director, and Mr. A. A. Sjoholm, Technical Director, Personnel
Research Division.
The author thanks Dr. E. I. Jones and Mr. E. M. Ramras , technical
directors of the Navy Personnel and Training Research Laboratory and Navy
Personnel Research and Development Laboratory, respectively, for reviewing
the draft of this study and making appropriate suggestions for the final
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I . INTRODUCTION
The two problems analyzed in t-his report are methods for evalu-
ating the performance effectiveness of the Navy's in-house personnel
research laboratories and means for improving their performance through
the adoption and application of new techniques and procedures. These
two problems can be considered together since they are related to the
more general question, What characterizes an effective, in-house, Federal
laboratory? They are related to this question because, first, the
characteristics of an effective laboratory could provide the basis for
devising criteria to evaluate the effectiveness of a given laboratory.
And such characteristics, when known, might also provide guidance for
recommending managerial and administrative practices to enhance the
effectiveness of a particular laboratory through the use of new and
innovative procedures.
Accordingly, the approach taken in this report is to begin with
the identification of salient features of organizational climates that
appear to be important to effective performance within research and
development (R&D) laboratories. Next, the environment or climate of
Federal, in-house laboratories will be examined. Following this, attempts
to assess and evaluate the effectiveness of R&D organization will be
examined with particular reference to in-house laboratories. Finally,
the specific procedures currently in use to evaluate the effectiveness
of the Navy's in-house, personnel research activities will be reviewed,
and recommendations will be made for improved procedures based on the
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information developed in the preceding investigation.
Recommendations for administrative and managerial practices to
foster the adoption and application of new research techniques and pro-
cedures in the Navy's personnel research laboratories will arise as a
by-product of the attempt to identify evaluation criteria and methods
for assessing the effectiveness of laboratories in the manner contem-
plated.
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II. CHARACTERISTICS OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT LABORATORIES
A. GENERAL TRENDS
Leaving undefined for the present what constitutes effectiveness
in R&D activities, it seems appropriate to assume that managerial and
organizational practices that are conducive to effective operations in
any type of organization are also applicable to R&D organizations, such
as laboratories. This assumption is examined in detail by Argyris (1968)
in its negative aspects. He explains how the detrimental features of a
typical pyramidal organizational structure can be magnified in the dy-
namic life of an R&D organization. The thrust of his argument is that
typical pyramidal organizations, when imposed on an R&D activity, may be
conducive to the steady deterioration of the activity. The deterioration
is primarily the result of improper controls imposed by the upper levels
of the organization that are based on mistrust, antagonism, and defen-
siveness. As a result, the system becomes increasingly rigid; less
competent personnel reach upper levels of the organization; accurate in-
formation ceases to flow through the system; paternalism begins to
flourish; more time is spent on generating valid, perhaps, but not very
important information; and nonresearch activities — "selling," budgets,
hiding bad news from the top — begin to take precedence over research
activities. The increasing frustration of the scientists in the organi-
zation is reflected by hesitating to take on responsibility and making
tangential demands for space, equipment, assistants, travel to professional
meetings, and the like. Good scientists leave the organization. As the
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R&D organization that is locked in to this deteriorating process grows
older, top management becomes disenchanted with it. Increasing . , .
intervention by the line departments, tighter research
budgets, more systematic evaluation of research, more
rigorous (hopefully) quantitative indices for evaluat-
ing research payoff, more use of charts to control the
flow of research, closer link with the marketplace and
a weaker tie with basic research, and finally, an in-
crease in the use of top-level committees to oversee
research can be expected. (Argyris, 1968, p. 353.)
The positive side of this argument is to design the controls,
organizational structures, and leadership styles so that the participants
".
. . may give of themselves rather than give up_ themselves" (Argyris,
1968, p. 347). The basis for designing such controls rests in openness,
respect for individuality, trust, concern, and a willingness to permit
risk-taking and innovation.
Controls, of course, imply pressure regardless of whether the
controls are good or bad, positive or negative. To most persons, pressure
in a job is an indication of undesirable stresses. In fact, the often
asked question about an individual is his ability to stand up under
pressure. Thus, a logical next step, following Argyris' critical ap-
praisal of controls in R&D organizations, is an examination of the role
of pressure. Should pressure be entirely undesirable? If so, how are
controls to be exercised? Merely through reward systems? The question,
according to Hall and Lawler (1971) , is not whether pressure is good or
bad but to determine when pressure is helpful and when it is dysfunc-
tional. They state that healthy persons have a need to experience in-
ternal pressure and will create it if the environment fails to provide it.
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In order to identify healthy pressures and their beneficial uses,
it is necessary to distinguish between pressure and such terms as conflict,
stress, tension, anxiety, and strain. To Hall and Lawler, job pressures
are forces a person experiences which motivate him to behave in partic-
ular ways on the job, and pressure is the experience of a particular
force. Strain, conflict, and similar conceptions represent the oppo-
sition of two or more pressures. With pressure thus defined, their re-
search identified three kinds of pressure that were mentioned from
laboratory to laboratory with considerable agreement as to their impor-
tance to research personnel. These were time, quality, and financial
responsibility. Time was a felt need to meet schedules and deadlines,
and it was typically externally imposed. Quality pressure was a concern
for doing a good technical job and seemed to be generated by the re-
searchers themselves, along with their colleagues. And finally, financial
responsibility was felt as a concern for the financial goal-attainment
of the organization as a whole.
These pressures were then related by Hall and Lawler (1971) to
the satisfaction and job involvement of the research worker and to the
effectiveness of the organization. Quality pressure was related posi-
tively to both job involvement of the individual professionals and to
the technical effectiveness of their laboratories. Job involvement was
also related to laboratory effectiveness. Financial responsibility
pressure was significantly correlated with both laboratory effectiveness
and the satisfaction of the researcher's need for autonomy. The impli-
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cation here was that the more a person helps to support himself and his
organization financially, the less dependent he is on the organization.
Time pressure, while not negatively related to any of the criteria, was
not related in a systematic way to researcher needs or to laboratory
effectiveness.
Hall and Lawler (1971) conclude:
. . . the most effective organizations are those in which
the professional value of technical excellence and/or the
organizational value of financial responsibility are in-
ternalized by the system as a whole. These two alternatives
indicate two separate types of adaptations — pressure for
quality reflects organizational adaption to professional
norms, while financial pressure suggests the professionals'
adaption to organizational values. (P. 70.)
This means, therefore, that in the effective system,
each member feels "on top of" the organization; he is
aware of the total system as it relates to its environment
and knows how his job ties in with the total goals of the
organization. This self and system awareness represents
a strong sense of organizational identification for the
person, and this experience when widely shared is an im-
portant dimension of organizational health. (P. 71.)
Pelz and Andrews (1966) , in their work on scientists in organi-
zations, also conclude that "... the scientists and engineers whom we
studied did effective work under conditions that were not completely
comfortable, but contained 'creative tensions' among forces pulling in
different directions" (p. 7). They (Pelz & Andrews, 1966; p. 7)
characterized broad features of the environment of the most productive
scientists and engineers, as follows:
'Effective scientists were self-directed by their own
ideas, and valued freedom. But at the same time they
allowed several other people a voice in shaping their
directions; they interacted vigorously with colleagues.
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'Effective scientists did not limit their activities
either to the world of "application" or to the world
of "pure science" but maintained an interest in both;
their work was diversified.
'Effective scientists were not fully in agreement with
their organization in terms of their interests; what
they personally enjoyed did not necessarily help them
advance in the structure.
'Effective scientists tended to be motivated by the same
kinds of things as their colleagues. At the same time,
however, they differed from their colleagues in the
styles and strategies with which they approached their
work.
"In effective older groups, the members interacted vig-
orously and preferred each other as collaborators, yet
they held each other at an emotional distance and felt
free to disagree on technical strategies.
From the literature reviewed above, it can be said— in general
—
that productive and efficient R&D laboratories use organizational con-
trols that embody pressures which are not dysfunctional, and their individual
scientists, while preserving their own independence and interests, are
flexible and dedicated to both the pursuit of quality in their work and
to the welfare of their organizations.
B. TRENDS IN FEDERAL LABORATORIES
Glass (1970, p. 11) writes that "Probably no class of institution
has been studied and analyzed, praised and criticized, organized and
reorganized to the degree that has been the lot of the Defense labora-
tories." His report (Glass, 1970) provides a comprehensive review of
the study, analysis, and evolution of Defense in-house laboratories.
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The status and potential of Federal laboratories are also discussed in
detail in the report of the hearings in March and April 1968 of the House
Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development, frequently referred
to as the Daddario Committee. (Hereafter it will be referred to as the
Subcommittee, 1968,) Pelz and Andrews (1966) also devote much of their
book to scientists in government laboratories. More recently, the Defense
Blue Ribbon Panel completed its investigation of Defense R&D activities
with recommendations for major changes and improvements in the system.
Especially germane to this report is the investigation of the Manpower
Research Task Force of the Defense Science Board, which is nearing
completion. Accordingly, the intent here is not to retrace this path of
study and analysis, praise and criticism. Rather, the purpose of this
section is to highlight salient characteristics of Federal and especially
Department of Defense (DoD) laboratories that may have a bearing on the
questions being examined in this report.
If professionals in good R&D laboratories identify with their
organizations as mentioned above, surely those in Federal laboratories
must do so with respect to the mission and purpose of their laboratories
and the problems that are selected for investigation. The Committee on
Federal Laboratories, for example, found that the single most important
factor in laboratory morale was a sense of purpose on the part of each
scientist and a sense that the results mattered to someone (Subcommittee,
1968). Harold B. Finger, Associate Administrator for Organization and
Management, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), testi-
-9-
fying before the Subcommittee, stated that the NASA experience confirmed
the value and importance of the purpose of an organization. He noted
that it would be very hard for a research organization to succeed if its
basic purposes and motivation seemed unimportant; on the other hand, a
research organization which has an important and significant role to ful-
fill has a very good start in the critical process of building and holding
a research competence. Dr. Donald M. McArthur, representing the Office of
the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) before the Sub-
committee, stated that the quality of a laboratory ". . . really comes
down in the end to a number of criteria, but an overriding criteria is
mission. Does it have a sense of purpose? Does it have high-quality
people, and are they performing well?" (Subcommittee, 1968; p. 151).
With respect to the mission or purpose of Federal laboratories,
Dr. Donald F. Hornig, director of the Office of Science and Technology,
Executive Office of the President, spoke to the Subcommittee of some things
that are not. He emphasized the point that these laboratories do not exist
to "accumulate a pile of knowledge," that they do not "turn over the grains
of sand in the Sahara Desert and examine them one by one," that theirs is
not the purpose to do research for its own sake. Their task is to solve
present problems and lay the foundation for the future; they must produce
the ideas on which the next generation of their parent agencies' activities
will be based. Accordingly, the laboratories need to have meaningful prob-
lems to work on, where the end results of what they do will be visible and
on which they could be judged. He mentioned a "multiplier effect" of the
-10-
product of research activities. That is, their effect is on present and
future programs of the entire Nation usually involving expenditures many
times greater than those directly involved in the laboratory operations.
Because of the "multiplier effect," Dr. Hornig stated that the utility of
Federal laboratories must be viewed in the context of their overall contri-
bution to national progress rather than in the narrow context of the admin-
istration of the laboratories themselves.
The mission or purpose of any government laboratory is operation-
ally manifested in the problems that are selected for investigation and
solution The speakers before the Subcommittee were in close agreement
over the fact that problem selection was the critical and most difficult
task facing laboratories and especially the laboratory director. They noted
that the input for making the decisions needed to come up from "the bench"
and the laboratorv management as well as from echelons above the laboratory.
Hornig stated that it is not usually true that a person sitting at the top
of the pyramid like himself, could sav what the problems really are and
what real technical problems are "soluble next year". He continued: "...
whether you make progress depends on picking the right detailed problems,
those which are ripe for solving at a given time. That requires keen tech-
nical insight." (Subcommittee, 1968; p. y.)
Problem selection with respect to the Navy's personnel research lab-
oratories is an extremely complex procedure that requires interaction between
the highest echelons of Navy management, several levels of middle management,
and the outlook at the "bench" in the laboratories themselves. Problem
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selection depends, first, on establishing goals and objectives that define
the total R&D program for the laboratories. This is accomplished, in turn,
by considering guidance from program sponsors and planning documents, spe-
cific consumer requests, policy changes, and the results of task-force in-
vestigations (such as the recent Blue Ribbon Defense Panel recommendations).
On the other hand, consideration in program definition must be given to the
current ongoing program, the timing of requirements and expected completion
of products, the capabilities of the laboratories, their stated missions,
and overall funding constraints. Finally, room must be provided for self-
generated ideas.
Once the goals and objectives of the overall program have been de-
fined, problem selection will then depend on priority determination and
an allocation of the necessary resources. Again, on one hand, the poten-
tial impact, significance, and payoff of the solution of a problem are
prime considerations, along with requests from program sponsors and con-
sumers. The current state of the art, requirements for additional research,
and the probability of success are also important factors. Again, there
are, on the other hand, the capabilities, specialization, and performance
history of those who would work on a problem and the investment required in
facilities, capital equipment, and personnel. Finally, there is a broad
allocation problem of the division in resource committment between research
and development, to the extent that these can be differentiated (Gaver &
Srinivasan, 1970). Underlying the entire area of problem selection is the
question of how to do it rigorously.
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Returning to the testimony before the Subcommittee, the most critical
questions in the effective utilization of Federal laobratories , according to
Hornig, were:
(1) The choice of problems, their significance, and the feasi-
bility of finding solutions through research and development;
(2) the creation of capabilities in the laboratories which can,
in fact, solve the most difficult problems; and (3) the trans-
lation of the results of the laboratories' work into action in
either the public or private sectors. (Subcommittee, 1968; p. 9.)
Mission orientation in government laboratories usually means that
there is a parent agency whose mission is being supported by the laboratory.
Hornig (Subcommittee, 1968; p. 13), for example, has said:
An effective R&D program involves a dynamic give and take be-
tween the laboratory and its parent agency. It must not only
carry out assigned tasks, but spell out the tasks which need
to be performed; it must be a source of ideas for its parent
agency and help the agency to put the laboratory's output into
practice. All of this requires a very close identification
between a laboratory and its sponsoring agency.
Mission orientation in R&D, on the other hand, may have both positive
and negative aspects (Nichols, 1971). The positive aspects of this rela-
tionship were explained in the Bell report (Bureau of the Budget, 1962) as
follows:
Federal operations, such as the governmental laboratory, enjoy
a close and continuing relationship to the agency they serve
which permits maximum responsiveness to the needs of that agency.
Such operations accordingly have a natural advantage in con-
ducting research, feasibility studies, developmental and ana-
lytical work, user tests and evaluations which directly support
the management functions of the agency. Furthermore, an agency-
operated research and development installation may provide a
useful source of technical management personnel for its sponsor.
However, Hornig, speaking before the subcommittee, also admitted that
almost all reports were in agreement that there is generally excessive
administrative control and not enough freedom given to the directors of
laboratories. He attributed this not only to civil service or other
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rules but to past practices and procedures. He mentioned specifically
as a difficult problem the relationship between military and civilian
personnel in the direction of DOD laboratories, a problem which was
accentuated by the policy of military rotation applied indiscriminately
to technically qualified officers.
The difficulty in handling parent agency-laboratory relationships
in a beneficial way and the persistence of problems in this area were
commented upon by Glass (1970, p. 25) in reference to the findings and
recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel issued on 1 July 1970.
After almost nine years of a concerted effort to improve
the climate and performance of in-house laboratories, the
findings of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel are somewhat
depressing. Some people believe that, as long as in-house
laboratories are organizationally imbedded deep within
the Military Departments, efforts to achieve long-term
improvements in laboratory operations are sure to fail.
They feel that there is no way to protect the laboratories
from the staggering overload of bureaucratic red tape
and from diffuse, fragmented middle management levels
that are apparently unable to delegate needed authority.
On the other hand, many people believe that the close
interaction of laboratories with their sponsors and
their Department's needs would be unnecessarily perturbed
if new organizational barriers were created.
The preceding discussion on the mission orientation of Federal
laboratories and their parent agency relationships have involved the area
of laboratory controls. That is, the mission orientation necessitates
selectivity in problems to be investigated, while negative aspects of
the parent agency-laboratory relationships are reminiscent of the dys-
functional aspects of pyramidal organizations described by Argyris. Are
there characteristics of Federal laboratories that are also similar to
the financial responsibility pressure mentioned by Hall and Lawler?
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One possible means of exerting pressure of this nature was vol-
unteered by Dr. William B. McLean, Technical Director, Navy Undersea
Warfare Center, to the Subcommittee (1968). He felt that competition
among laboratories in given areas was necessary so that the effectiveness
of the laboratories could be demonstrated on a comparative basis. The
process, he thought, would provide high incentives, high motivation, and
the "only nonsubjective measure of effectiveness in R&D . . . ." (Sub-
committee, 1968; p. 80). Daddario, however, suggested that it would be
difficult to implement such a plan of duplicate or overlapping laboratory
facilities so that Congress could effectively deal with it in the final
determination and allocation of funds. McLean suggested that the situa-
tion actually existed in some areas—for example, the Air Force probably
provided much competition to NASA.
McArthur, commenting on McLean's suggestion, took a different
approach. He remarked that competition for funds exists within the DOD
laboratory structure and that this runs the gamut from no competition
for funds to laboratories that are almost totally competitive for funds.
Noting that the latter tends towards laboratories becomming "job shops"
with few or no longer range programs, he added that the optimum is some-
where between the two.
Mr. E. M. Glass, DoD Assistant Director for Laboratories, who
was accompanying McArthur, commented that a laboratory should have to
compete for at least 25 percent of its funds to stay healthy. The 80 to
90 percent of their funding that some Navy laboratories were competing
-15-
for from various customers (at that time) was thought to be excessive.
He observed also that the situation with the Air Force laboratories,
which received "block funding" and were not dependent at all on customers,
could be made healthier if they had to compete for some of their funds.
Competing for funds from a customer, he explained, resulted in a healthier
situation by coupling laboratories more closely with their customers.
Thus, it is obvious that pressures not unlike "contract pressures"
experienced in the non-Government laboratories also exist in the Federal
laboratory structure. Accordingly, the organizational committment of
scientists should be a characteristic of Federal as well as civilian
laboratories. That this is a characteristic of effective Federal labora-
tories has already been mentioned in some of the comments reported above.
The general environment of Federal laboratories, when it has been
bad, has been due to weakness in the areas of pay and professional benefits,
lack of challenging assignments and personnel recognition, and the arbi-
trary use of bureaucratic regulations with resulting frustrations and
inhibiting effects (Glass, 1970). To this list might be added inadequate
on-the-job support, as reported by the standing committee to the Federal
Council on Laboratories. The standing committee also stated that such
things as job titles, the retention of rights to patents, consulting fees
and honoraria, security matters, and freedom to consult, lecture, and
teach were considered relatively unimportant by the vast majority of
1,025 Federal scientists who were respondents to a questionnaire. (Sub-
committee, 1968).
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Characteristics of a desirable organizational environment that
would maximize effectiveness were prepared by a Bureau of the Budget
committee in conjunction with the Bell report (Bureau of the Budget ,1962)
.
The basic requirements for such an organizational climate were (Glass,
1970, p. 33 and Appendix IV):
Reputation and atmosphere
Excellence of staff and its direction
Importance of facilities and support
Clarity, challenge and urgency of objectives
Maintenance of professional caliber of operations
Professional leadership by professionals
Professional recognition and encouragement
Encouragement and support of freedom of inquiry and method
Advancement on merit
Absence of unproductive regulations and reports
C. DIMENSIONS OF THE SCIENTIST-LABORATORY INTERFACE
The preceding analysis dealt with laboratories in general and
more specifically with Federal laboratories. Some factors tending to
enhance or inhibit the effectiveness of these laboratories were identified
and discussed. When R&D laboratories are considered in the aggregate, it
may be possible and even advantageous to think of individual laboratories
as basic entitites with characteristics and "personalities" of their own.
From the standpoint of assessing the relative effectiveness of laboratories,
this method may also be appropriate. In fact, a DoD program is in progress
that takes this approach (Glass, 1969). Individual laboratories are being
ranked on the basis of their effectiveness or excellence and the relation-
ships of various laboratory characteristics to this measure of relative
excellence are being examined. On the other hand, when one's concern is
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in assessing the absolute effectiveness of a specific laboratory and also
involves administrative and managerial approaches for upgrading that
laboratory's capabilities, he must look for different items of information.
He must look below the overall laboratory level to that area of dynamic
interaction between the characteristics of the laboratory and the char-
acteristics of its individual professionals who man the laboratory. This
level might be called the level of the scientist-laboratory interface.
The characteristics of a laboratory might include such factors as
its geographic location, whether it is located separately or within a
larger military complex, overall size, budget and source of funds, sub-
ject area of research, location in the organizational chain of command,
position on the research or developmental end of the R&D continuum, bal-
ance between in-house and contracted-out research, type and degree of
external control exerted on the laboratory, and so on. These variables
may be important in the comparative evaluation of laboratories. At least,
they provide convenient and reasonably reliable categories for describing
individual laboratories. But when one is dealing with one laboratory,
many of these variables become constants which are of interest only to
the extent that they define the boundary conditions within which the
laboratory must operate.
On the other side of the interface, a great deal of research has
been conducted regarding the characteristics, attitudes, and motivations
of individual professionals in R&D. In the Hall and Lawler (1971) studies,
for example, satisfaction of professionals surveyed was measured on a
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hierarchy of human needs. Their questionnaire yielded scores for security,
social esteem, autonomy, self-fulfillment, and a composite score which
was a single average of the part scores. Job involvement was measured by
an attitude scale. As in the Hall and Lawler studies, many other attempts
have been made to find behavioral or output correlates of such personal
attributes. These output criteria might be mobility, promotion, or some
measure of volume, quality, and influence of an individual's work. But
here again, in the case of a specific laboratory, one is not sure whether
the previously found relationships will hold between the personal variables
and the criterion variables. Why? First, effect of personal variables, such
as satisfaction and job involvement, on output are dependent on other
characteristics of the individual. For example, the relationship of satis-
faction to some measure of output in laboratories may depend on the age
distribution of the laboratory's scientists. Second, the relationship of
the personal variables to the outcome variables is mediated by variables
that are dimensions of the work or laboratory environment. And third,
since much of this research is correlational, it is often difficult or
impossible to infer the causal direction of the relationships established.
For example, how much of job involvement is something intrinsic to the
individual that he brings to the job and how much the result— the output
—
of his experience with the laboratory work environment?
Accordingly, when interest is centered on a specific laboratory,
the crucial relationships are at the level of the scientist-laboratory
interface. Detailed information is necessary which states how manipulation
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of the alternatives available to laboratory management affect different
scientists to bring about specific outcomes or results. It is especially
important to discriminate between inputs and outputs. The laboratory's
mission and tasks, externally imposed, are inputs which can be considered
as constants, as previously explained. The scientist and what he brings
to the laboratory in his person is the other input category. The labora-
tory environment or climate in which the scientist and the laboratory's
organizational structures, procedures, and facilities interact might be
called process. The result of the interaction is output, which includes
the tangible products and services of the laboratory and also such secon-
dary outcomes as experienced manpower and changes in the attitudes and
outlook of the scientists. Thus, there is a mechanism for change, since
the input (the scientist) will have been changed in the process for the
next iteration. Similarly, the outcomes will provide feedback to the
laboratory management for suggested changes in the operational environment
These categories— input, process, output, and feedback—might be called



















Figure 1. Simplified structure and dynamics of laboratory operations,
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The stages can be further broken down into dimensions and variables
as shown in figure 2. Of the input variables, education can be broken
down into PhD, non-PhD, and Engineer categories. Pelz and Andrews (1966)
used these categories and further classified their subjects into (1) PhD's
in development-oriented laboratories, (2) PhD's in research-oriented
laboratories, (3) non-PhD' s in development-oriented laboratories not
dominated by PhD's (called "engineers")? (4) non-PhD's in PhD-dominated
laboratories (called "assistant scientists") , and (5) non-PhD scientists
in research-oriented laboratories not dominated by PhD's (all in Govern-
ment settings). Age is a continuous, quantitative variable which can be
categorized, if desired. Orientation is an individual's preference for
research or development activities. Specialization can be identified by
an individual's area of specializationand further subdivided into the
number of subareas in which he feels competent to do work. Professional
style refers to the type of problems and the approach one prefers. The
other dimensions—attitude, ability, personality, physical makeup—are
named to fill out the list. Numerous other variables might be listed. Of
the listed dimensions, education and age are parameters that can be most
reliably obtained for personnel in a laboratory. Orientation, speciali-
zation, and professional style could be readily obtained by some form of
questioning the technical staff. The others are more complex, more diffi-
cult to assess, and more unlikely to be related to the process and output
variables in any simple, predictable manner.
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procedures and working environment of the laboratory. These are the
elements that can be manipulated to change the output variables. Orien-
tation refers to the research vs. development bent of the laboratory.
The proportion of short vs. long-range programs could be another variable
in this dimension. The important dimension of control can be identified
by a number of variables such as loose vs. tight, number of checkoffs
required for decision making, degree of influence assertable by the indi-
vidual scientist in decision making, and sources of ideas and persons
involved in -goal setting. The time span of discretion might be another
variable in the control area. Work unit characteristics can be defined
by the degree of homogeneity or similarity of the individuals within the
unit and the size and age of the unit. Individual assignments can be
classified into the proportion of time spent in R&D work vs. adminis-
trative tasks, the proportion of technical time spent in research vs.
development activities, and the number of R&D functions to which one is
assigned. The communication structure and dynamics of the laboratory
can be defined in terms of the number of contacts an individual has within
his own work unit, the number of contacts he has outside the work unit,
and the frequency of these contacts. Rewards can be looked at from the
traditional aspects of promotion, pay, and fringe benefits; they might
be identified by some less tangible forms of reinforcement, such as re-
cognition.
The problem in using the process variables in any analysis is
their method of measurement. On one hand, many values could be determined
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by asking the management and by going through organization charts and
other laboratory documentation. But research, and the practical ex-
perience of many persons, has shown that official statements and the
opinions of the individual workers in the organization may vary con-
siderably. Since the framework of analysis described above involves the
interaction between the individual scientist and the laboratory operating
environment, it would probably be necessary to ask the scientist to scale
most of these variables from his own point of view.
Turning to the output variables, those listed under product or
service require further operational definition before they can be mean-
ingfully evaluated. This problem will be taken up in the next section
of this paper. The attitude change variables, again, would have to be
assessed on the basis of solicited individual opinions.
The foregoing list of variables borrows heavily from the monu-
mental Pelz and Andrews (1966) work on scientists in organizations; their
categorization by dimensions and stages and the inferred direction of
causation do not. The description and discussion of general trends in
the R&D field, and especially in laboratories, plus the detailed break-
down of the structure and dynamics within a laboratory, should provide
the necessary background and framework for analyzing the specific prob-
lems posed in this study and making appropriate recommendations for their
solution.
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III. EVALUATION OF LABORATORIES
A. PURPOSE, NEED, AND APPROACHES
Evaluation of the effectiveness of laboratory performance is a
responsibility of those who manage the laboratories and the parent agencies
that support them. While the need—or requirement—and even the desire
to do so may be strong, the question of how to conduct the evaluation is
one that has not found a universally acceptable answer. Even the question
of "why" may not find a convergence of answers. Glass (1969, p. 1) writes:
R&D managers have been trying for many years to devise
better yardsticks to measure the effectiveness and utility
of laboratories. Most managers agree that such techniques
are needed, but few can agree on how such appraisals can or
should be made.
The evaluation of laboratories was a question of prime importance
to the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development as an aspect of
fostering the best utilization of Federal laboratories. Most of the wit-
nesses before the Subcommittee were asked to comment upon their philosophy
and approaches to laboratory evaluation. In addition, the witnesses were
asked to submit answers to written questions provided them following their
appearance before the Subcommittee. One of the questions dealt with the
problem of evaluation. The views expressed in their statements provide
excellent insight into the mechanisms of evaluation and the philosophy be-
hind the approaches taken.
Hornig (Subcommittee, 1968; p. 22), provided a broad overview of
the appraisal of laboratories:
Appraisal of in-house laboratory performance is
a normal responsibility of agency management. . . .
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Procedures in use in the Government
. . . involve such
techniques as visits to the laboratory by teams of agency
management representatives; evaluation of results by
agency management and—especially where more basic re-
search is involved—by outside advisory groups; and
continuing reviews of laboratory operations through re-
ports, audits, conferences, day-to-day contacts, and
so on. In some cases, development activities lend them-
selves to controlled scheduling procedures such as PERT,
but such control methods are generally not applicable to
research near the basic end of the spectrum. Evaluations
are necessarily qualitative rather than quantitative to
a considerable degree, and involve judgments based on
such factors as experience and comparison with good
practice elsewhere.
The prime objective is not the application of any
specific set of administrative techniques, but the eleva-
tion of the quality and efficiency of administration of
Federal laboratories totally, including such matters as
maintenance of challenging and relevant laboratory missions,
elevation of salary scales to attract first class managers,
and securing sufficient freedom for laboratory managers.
McLean (Subcommittee, 1968; p. 84) brought out the difficulty of
finding a proper criterion to measure in-house laboratory effectiveness
that could be compared with the profit-loss ledger of the profit-oriented
civilian enterprises. He also mentioned the need for subjective appraisals
and review committees, as follows:
For any organization or individual to feel success-
ful there must be some mechanism for measuring the degree
in which they have fulfilled their goals. In an organiza-
tion which is profit-oriented, such an evaluation is straight-
forward, rigorous, and simple. If the figures are in the
black, all associated with the organization are happy. If
they are in the red, or tending toward the red, then some-
thing must be done to rectify the situation. Government
organizations, military organizations, educational institu-
tions, and research and development activities, whenever
they are adequately removed from the profit-making pressures,
have a more difficult time in establishing a proper evaluation
of the effectiveness of their processes and results. For
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all such organizations I believe the evaluation must
be on the basis of competition similar to that in-
volved in making a profit. The fact, however, that
results cannot easily be expressed in terms of a
single variable, such as money, tends to make the
evaluation process much more difficult. Governments
are judged by history, and military organizations by
wars. These are very harsh and final judgments and
do not provide a very adequate, self-rectifying mech-
anism.
In essence, the appraisal of contractor and
laboratory performance is limited by the capabilities
of the individuals available to perform the appraisal.
Of necessity, an appraiser must be a person who has
been very successful in the field being evaluated.
Yet, every appraiser has his own set of biases and
believes that his own approach is the only correct
approach. The competitive system is the only appraisal
system that leaves open the possibility of innovation.
In spite of these difficulties in evaluation, the
Navy is setting up technically competent review commit-
tees to review laboratory performance. The effect of
these committees on laboratory performance has yet to be
evaluated.
In his testimony before the Subcommittee, Astin acknowledged the
need to have some mechanism for "rating" the many laboratories within his
organization, the National Bureau of Standards, and implied that the pur-
pose of such ratings was to do something about strengthening ineffective
management and leadership and to encourage those that were strong. In
his written comments, however, he presented (Subcommittee, 1968; p 69) an
excellent discussion of the mechanism of program review as an evaluative
process
:
. . . An annual or sometimes more frequent series of
reviews of all of the significant programs of the Bureau
are made by operating personnel to top NBS officials.
Generally programs are closely related to one or several
organizational units. The program of each division is
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also subject to review at least annually by Advisory Com-
mittees of the National Academy of Sciences. Finally, an
outside evaluation of the Bureau as a whole is made by a
Statutory Visiting Committee which reports annually to the
Secretary of Commerce on the efficiency of NBS operations.
At the program reviews those responsible for the
program discuss their past accomplishments, present work
and future program plans. Information is given and ques-
tions raised concerning the adequacy and competence of the
staff and future requirements; similar matters are covered
in respect to facilities, equipment, funds and other re-
sources. Program requirements and priorities are discussed
in respect to their relationship to national needs. On the
basis of all of the above, the present health and future
outlook of Bureau programs are assessed by NBS officials,
priorities are set, and appropriate allocations and commit-
ments are made. Occasionally decisions are made that some
programs of substantially diminished importance have out-
lived their usefulness. When such decisions are made, the
staff members involved are reassigned when possible or re-
duced in force when reassignment is impractical.
Other speakers before the Subcommittee also referred to project
and program reviews and evaluation panels and advisory groups as mechanisms
for conducting the assessment of laboratory effectiveness. Some, particu-
larly the NASA representative, emphasized continuous and close technical/
professional communications between the headquarters and the laboratory as
a means of appraising laboratory performance. The comments of MacArthur
(Subcommittee, 1968; p. 151) were of particular relevance to this study:
When we evaluate the quality of a laboratory there
are many criteria we use. The three services, the Air
Force, the Army, and the Navy, have advisory groups which
periodically review the programs of the laboratories and
come up with recommendations in terms of whether they are
above standards, below standard, fine, mediocre, whatever
they might be.
We also look at whether they have meaningful missions.
Secondly, within the Department of Defense at the
D.D.R. & E. level where I come from, we look at programs
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from a programmatic standpoint, from a technical stand-
point, and at that point we look at the contributions
the laboratories are making to that program.
Thirdly, as you no doubt know, some of our labor-
atories are involved at only one end of the R. & D
.
spectrum, research and technology. Other laboratories
are involved throughout the whole R.&D. spectrum through
engineering development and test and evaluation.
Now, one of the criteria we use when a laboratory
is involved at the research and technology end of the
spectrum is how much of their output over the last few
years has been incorporated in some of our systems devel-
opment programs
.
In a laboratory that is involved in engineering
development, we look at the effectiveness of the systems
or hardware they have developed or managed, and, lastly,
we look at the individual laboratory director's inde-
pendent research program and look at how he has managed
his funds, what he has done, where he has invested them,
but the real test is how much business he got based on
those investments he has made.
Among the supplemental questions addressed to MacArthur, was one
that asked him to explain the DoD system for evaluating contractors that
provide R&D and to state to what extent the system should or could be used
in appraising the work of the in-house laboratories. MacArthur, in his
reply, described the DoD Contractor Performance Evaluation (CPE) Program,
a system designed to provide an orderly and uniform technique of determin-
ing and recording the effectiveness of contractors primarily for hardware
development and production. In evaluating the appropriateness of the CPE
procedure for in-house laboratory appraisals, MacArthur 's comments (Sub-
committee, 1968; p. 180) were particularly illuminating:
For those contracts where the end product is new
technology or new scientific findings, CPE can be utilized,
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if the Military Departments consider it desirable. How-
ever, a less formal evaluation of such contracts is gen-
erally utilized. This is usually in the form of a sub-
jective appraisal by the project monitor.
The CPE System appears to be most suitable for
evaluating specific programs for which there are meaning-
ful performance standards and mileposts. I might add that
similar criteria are utilized to evaluate the hardware
development laboratories, although in a different form.
In other words, the CPE System is designed to evaluate
performance on a specific well-defined project or program.
Its purpose is not to evaluate over-all organizational
effectiveness
.
Much of the work of Defense laboratories is in the
areas of long-range research and technology. Thus, a
system such as CPE would not be generally applicable.
One advantage we see in the establishment of military prob-
lem oriented weapon centers is that the utility of their
output can be measured fairly directly on a real-time
basis. Practically everyone knows and can measure the tre-
mendous productivity of a NOTS , China Lake. Its output
goes directly into the military inventory. On the other
hand, the output or product of a research laboratory is
much more difficult to assess. Many years may pass before
the utilization of new science or technology can be meas-
ured meaningfully
.
The principal method used for Defense laboratories
is peer rating or evaluation, either by in-house people,
those on the outside, or combinations of both. This is
only part of the story, however. Program evaluation in
terms of need, priority, technical content, and similar
factors probably have a greater bearing upon the appraisal
of laboratories than direct institutional evaluation.
Through program evaluation, one usually makes decisions
on resource allocation which ultimately determine the future
of that laboratory responsible for the program execution.
The comments to the Subcommittee extracted above were representative
of the others who testified. The needs and purposes of the evaluations
seemed to fall under the following categories:
Determine the quality and efficiency of the administration
Evaluate the meaningfulness of programs
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Determine the health and future outlook of programs
Look for challenging, relevant missions; adequate
pay of professional staff; and freedom for the
laboratory manager
Set priorities and determine allocation and commit-
ment of funds
Look for laboratories and/or programs that have
served their usefulness to shut them down
Shore up the management and leadership where necessary;
give encouragement to good leadership
Provide guidance to the laboratories
Determine adequacy and competence of staff and future
requirements
Determine adequacy of facilities, equipment, funds,
and other resources.
They all tended to agree that evaluation of the research and tech-
nology end of the R&D spectrum is the difficult problem, that this has to
be done subjectively/qualitatively, and that some sort of panel of experts
is an appropriate mechanism. There was an underlying current that program
evaluation and institutional evaluation are different but that program re-
views over a period of time can serve the function of institutional reviews.
Perhaps the distinction between program reviews and institutional reviews
lies in the criteria available for evaluation. Program reviews have more
specific goals against which progress towards those goals can be evaluated.
Institutional reviews, however, emphasize such intangibles as overall quality,
relevance of work attempted, and technical competence. If this were so,
then the distinction between program reviews and institutional reviews might
be one of performance vs. quality. It should be noted that good performance
on the part of a laboratory does not necessarily ensure effectiveness or
quality in the product, even in hardware systems. (This matter will be
further elaborated under the discussion of evaluation criteria.)
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B. ADVISORY PANELS
Since the use of advisory panels seems to be generally accepted as
a method for evaluating laboratories, a more detailed examination of the
process would seem to be in order. While the panels are usually termed
advisory, the term may mean anything from the simple lack of directive
authority, at one end, to advisory in the literal sense of the word at the
other. Usually, the distinction is closely associated with the level of
the convening authority of the panel, tending to be more closely allied to
direction monitoring, and decision-making processes when it is formed by,
and reports to, a headquarters above the laboratory. Another dimension
underlying the panel system is the constitution of the panel—that is, the
source and types of persons making up the panel. And finally, closely re-
lated to these two dimensions, is that of the basic purpose of a panel.
The following interchange between Daddario and MacArthur at the
Subcommittee's (1968, p. 152) hearings highlights the use of advisory
panels at the highest levels in the services:
Mr. Daddario. You talk about judgment by peers. Who
are they and how do you get them together?
Dr. MacArthur. There are three—let me address each
service. In the Air Force we have a board of advisers which
is a panel of the scientific advisory board and they are
from the outside. They involve individuals from the indus-
trial world, individuals from the universities, and from
nonprofit organizations.
In the Navy we have the technical evaluation board
which is a part of the Naval Research Advisory Council.
Again, all members of this advisory board or technical
evaluation group are from outside the Department of Defense.
The Army is different in that they have a group which
is composed solely of all in-house individuals and they per-
form an appraisal every 3 years. We call it the triannual
survey group.
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These are the advisory boards I referred to.
Mr. Daddario. How are the laboratory directors in-
volved in the evaluation, if at all?
Dr. MacArthur. Well, these advisory boards, they do
more than read papers. They actually visit the labs. They
talk to the laboratory directors and the key people at the
laboratories to see what they are involved in, what they
are doing, what their mission is, what they have contributed
in the last year, and what they intend to work on in the
following years, and why.
One of the biggest problems we have been having in the
past years was that some of these laboratories weren't in-
volved in important questions. That is one of the things
we have been stressing, that they have to get more involved
in important military problems.
Here, while there is obviously interaction between the panels and
the laboratories, the purpose of the panels seems generally to be to advise
the responsible command above the laboratory level and to encourage the
implementation of the command's policies—e.g., become more involved in rel-
evant military problems. The evaluative nature of the panel is especially
evident in the Army's case by its constitution. On the other hand, the
following exchange between Daddario and Astin (Subcommittee, 1968; p. 50)
very definitely implies a panel that is responsive at the laboratory direc-
tor's level and serves at his discretion.
Mr. Daddario. How do you bring the individuals to-
gether and how do you allow the people who are involved in
the Federal laboratories to participate? Yesterday we had
some testimony on the need to do this more often than we
do, not only because you can get different points of view,
but also because laboratory directors would find out more
what was going on and they could improve their own manage-
ment activities.
Dr. Astin. Well, it is my feeling that every labora-
tory manager or director should have some responsibility
for formulating at least a portion of his program. In gen-
eral the laboratory supports the mission of the agency, and
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to be effective, it has to be responsive. But if the
program is to be dynamic and effective, then formulation
of some portion of this program has to be under the con-
trol of the laboratory manager.
At the same time it is desirable, I think, for him
to have mechanisms for seeking advice from experts in the
technologies involved. In general advisory committees to
laboratory managers have proved very helpful.
The discussion in section A, above, also emphasized the role of
panels in program formulation and evaluation. One of the "purest" examples
of the use of panels for such purposes is the practice in some Federal
agencies to assemble panels of specialists to evaluate proposals for Federal
support. The problem that may arise when scientists themselves are used
as the panel members is explained by Nichols (1971, p. 33):
Some representatives and senators have been asking
searching questions about what they see as an overelaborate
"buddy system" masquerading as a scientific "judicial system".
All too few people in Congress understand the enormous, largely
unpaid efforts invested by scientists in the panel review sys-
tem used by most agencies to evaluate proposals for federal
support. Worse still, the dedication of most of these review-
ers to high quality is just not grasped by a number of influ-
ential members and staff of congressional committees. Log-
rolling, it seems to some congressmen, is being increasingly
substituted for what were once rigorous standards of scientific
quality and productivity.
*********
Despite the valiant and often insightful efforts of a
few scientist-analysts, Congress sees little progress being
made in solving the difficult "apples and oranges" problem of
allocating resources to and within various federal R&D areas.
Nichols' comments suggest that advisory panels play an important
decision-making role in the Federal R&D effort. When this is the purpose
of a panel, Gideonse (1970) adds another dimension to the use of panels
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for program evaluation. He maintains that the scientist-panel approach
to decision making is only proper for nan-mission-oriented agencies and
those supporting fundamental research. But when agencies have more spe-
cific missions, persons selected to serve in an advisory capacity must
have the expertise required to make the decisions involved, especially of
a policy setting nature.
Thus, the use of advisory panels in the management of R&D activities
is a complex procedure involving at least a consideration of the purpose
of the panel, the agency that it supports, and who shall constitute the
panel. Finally, as mentioned in section II A, top-level committees formed
as "overseers" of research may well be a symptom of deterioration in the
R&D process and not a cure (Argyris, 1968).
C. CRITERIA
Criteria to be used for evaluating laboratories are closely linked
to the purpose of the evaluation. In addition, criteria are of little
worth if there is no way to provide measurements which indicate a position
on the criterion for a given laboratory. Thus, such terms as measures of
effectiveness, figures of merit, cost/benefit ratios, and so forth arise
to fill this need. Unfortunately, the possibility of finding appropriate
measurements—"yardsticks," according to Glass—become more remote as the
purpose of the evaluation becomes global and abstract. In fact, it becomes
difficult just to find appropriate criteria, much less methods for measure-
ment, when such is the case. Take, for example, the desire to determine
the technical excellence of a laboratory. What criteria does one use to
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to do this? And what measurements are to be taken to denote the position
of a laboratory on the criterion?
One approach is to look for intermediate, more readily quantifiable
criteria as estimates of the more general, abstract criteria. This approach
assumes, of course, that the relationships of the intermediate or part
criteria to each other and to the higher level criteria are known. Usually
this is not the case. This approach, when carried to the extreme, results
in measurements of manner of performance—or simply, performance—rather
than measures of quality (Hatry, 1970). Typically, such measures involve
quantity of output, rate of production/output, costs, manpower utilization,
adherence to schedules, adherence to standards and specifications, and so
forth. As indicators of workload and managerial efficiency the measures
may be appropriate. A dramatic example of the meaninglessness of such
measures involves the gross national product (GNP)
,
presumably an indicator
of the quality of life in the nation. A family makes a contribution to the
GNP when its mother dies: the GNP goes up because more expenditures are
necessary to procure the services which the mother formerly provided for
nothing (Clausen, 1971). A similar, although not so dramatic an example,
can arise when program reviews are used for the evaluation of a laboratory
and progress on a PERT or GANTT chart is used as the criterion of the quality
or utility of the work being performed. In fact, the opposite is more
likely to be true: quality is sacrificed to meet the milestones.
Another problem in evaluating R&D work in personnel research is the
fact that it deals with human beings and their value systems (Gideonse,
1971). Consequently, the findings, results, and recommendations of research-
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even the topics chosen to be researched—are evaluated against social and
political criteria of a very general nature over and above the scientific
quality of the work. To find, as the Navy did some years ago, that vol-
unteers from certain areas of the United States who were very young and
high-school dropouts created so much trouble that the Navy would be better
off not enlisting them has the seeds of a very touchy, social-political
problem. On the other hand, if personnel and behavioral science research
does not come to grips with socially relevant, politically loaded questions,
it will be criticized for skirting the problems that "really count." It
is understood that the Taskforce on Manpower of the Defense Science Board
is taking a very hard look at the adequacy of Defense manpower research in
respect to the pressing, social-political problems that involve the Depart-
ment of Defense. The problems involved in finding adequate criteria for
research and program evaluation dealing with the "quality of life" are
thoroughly explored by Clausen (1971) and Hatry (1970)
.
Another, and often unrecognized, area creating difficulty in assess-
ing the effectiveness of personnel research and human factors/man-machine
R&D requires mention. This is the fact that the absence of problems in a
completed system is a sign of good work in these disciplines. For example,
an operator in a complex system may find information displayed so it is
readily monitored; controls of the right size, shape, and location; and
work-space and environment conducive to extended-duration performance in
comfort. His training, job aids, work procedures, and workload are adequate
He has ready communication channels to other operators or superiors when
necessary. Years of research on small, apparently insignificant research
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problems have all contributed to the knowledge required to achieve this
situation. An experienced and talented group, thoroughly conversant with
this knowledge, is required to put this wealth of information into the
system design. Yet current research of the same type, looking to the future,
may be severely criticized by the unsophisticated observer as, for example,
"analysis of variance" research on insignificant or irrelevant problems
with little prospect of payoff. It is indeed a difficult problem to deter-
mine the payoff or effectiveness of long-term research at or near the basic
science end of the R&D spectrum.
Returning, again, to the hearings of the Subcommittee on Science,
Research, and Development, some of the criteria mentioned by those testi-
fying were as follows:
1) Comparison of a laboratory with "experience"
2) Comparison with "good practice"
3) How much of the output of research and technology has
been incorporated into system development programs
4) Effectiveness of the system hardware managed by the
laboratory
5) Amount of subsequent business received from an initial
expenditure of independent laboratory research funds
6) Peer ratings
The majority of these criteria depend on judgment, partly or completely, in
the evaluative process. The third listed has often been called "implementa-
tion," and is largely anecdotal. A direct, simple approach to implementing
the "implementation" criterion is highly likely to be seriously criticized
as in the case of Project HINDSIGHT (Radnor, Rubenstein, and Tansik, 1970).
Item 4 is obviously the ultimate criterion, but the only valid measurement
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is performance in the operational environment. Ignoring the difficulty
in doing this, there is an added problem of evaluating partial criteria
for laboratories that support the system manager. For example, when a
personnel laboratory provides the personnel subsystem for a system, there
is no way to evaluate precisely the contribution of the personnel sub-
system to the total system effectiveness. Item 5 is also closely related
to implementation, and has a strong judgmental component. Accordingly,
all but the last mentioned criterion reflect the context in which the
other criteria are often used—namely, in advisory panel reviews. Peer
ratings will be discussed below under methods.
Additional criteria which have been used in appraising and evalu-
ating R&D can also be compiled from other sources (Hall & Lawler, 1971;
Hoshovsky, 1970; Pelz & Andrews, 1966; US Atomic Agency Manual, Appendix)
A partial listing includes the following, which are shown irrespective of
the distinction between performance measures vs. quality measures:
Inventiveness in advancing technologies
Quality and originality of ideas and proposals
Discernment in determining when lines of inquiry become
unprofitable
Stature of individuals and organization within the scien-
tific community
Overall manpower levels in relation to work output
Effectiveness of personnel policies in attracting and re-
taining qualified technical staff
Net change in R&D budget during the last year
Number of new internally funded projects
Percent of projects meeting schedule
Number of projects/contracts renewed
Percent of projects meeting cost budget
Ratio of contracts won to contracts proposed
Number of papers in professional journals
Number of patents and patent applications
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Number of technical reports
Frequency of visits to laboratory
Quick fixes, problem solution events
Citations in the literature
Requests for laboratory reports, services
Percent of project completed to those started
D. METHODS
Two methods of evaluation have been mentioned in the discussion.
One was the use of advisory panels, and the other was peer ratings. Since
advisory panels use ad hoc procedures which depend on their purpose and
constituency, as previously discussed, they will not be further considered
for methodology. Accordingly, this section will concentrate on the peer
rating methods. Before entering into an examination of peer ratings, how-
ever, two other approaches suggested by the criteria involved should be
mentioned.
The first is system effectiveness as an indicator of the effective-
ness of the laboratory which held primary management responsibilities for
the system. It was said that personnel laboratories provide input only in
the form of subsystems which cannot be evaluated in any precise manner for
their contribution to total system effectiveness. This is true in the
case of military hardware systems. On the other hand, the personnel labor-
atories have prime responsibility for certain soft systems, such as computer
models for personnel planning, personnel selection devices and procedures,
training packages and computer-aided course materials. Traditional measures
of worth could be applied in such instances—measures such as reduction in
reaction time, workload, and costs and an increase in efficiency. But in
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this initial examination of the laboratory evaluation problem, this area
will not be further elaborated. Two reasons might be given for this de-
cision. In the first place, such programs are less than a majority of the
total laboratory program. Second, there is the complicating factor of
false starts, seemingly interminable programs, and junked programs of
this nature that must also be considered in measuring the effectiveness
of the laboratory with respect to its own system development projects.
Finally, as an initial procedure, a peer rating method could be devised
to obtain judgmental evaluations of the value, quality, and effectiveness
of programs in this area.
The other area of evaluation that might be applied to the products
of personnel research laboratories stems from the implementation criterion,
The approach would be to determine the degree to which products of the
laboratory have been accepted into system designs or into system design
methodology. This is also a complicated area in respect to an effective-
ness evaluation of the laboratories. For example, implementation of a
product does not necessarily mean that greater effectiveness was achieved.
The opposite could be the case. And again, the projects that are termi-
nated prior to implementation decisions must also be considered in the
evaluation. Implementation of a laboratory product in a particular appli-
cation might also be less than 100 percent of the laboratory package, or
the product might be significantly modified by the user before and during
implementation. And finally, lack of implementation by the user agency
does not necessarily mean that the product was ineffective, since many
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factors are involved in the nonacceptance of innovations in the Navy
(Mecherikoff & Mackie, 1970). Again, as with the system effectiveness
measure, products which might be evaluated using the implementation cri-
terion can also be assessed judgmentally using peer rating methods as
the initial step.
The evaluation of laboratory effectiveness and quality by peer
ratings in the DoD stems from the work of Pelz and Andrews (1966). Their
objective was not an evaluation of laboratory effectiveness, however.
Rather, they were interested in the organizational and individual, per-
sonal variables that lead to effectiveness among scientists in R&D settings.
But obviously, the quality of individual work in an organization is clearly
related to institutional effectiveness. Accordingly, a method to evaluate
the effectiveness of individuals in an organization is essentially a method
for the evaluation of the quality of the institution itself. In fact, Hall
and Lawler (1971) had R&D organization managers rate the quality of their
individual scientists and then these ratings were combined into a global
rating of laboratory performance effectiveness. They did this to circumvent
the difficult problem of having the laboratory director rate himself by
rating the quality of his laboratory.
Pelz and Andrews had senior scientists and managers in R&D organi-
zations rate their scientists on two criteria. These were: (1) Their
contribution to general technical or scientific knowledge within their
field (in the last 5 years) and (2) their overall usefulness in helping
the organization carry out its responsibilities (within the last 5 years)
.
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Now the difficult problems that accompany a mass rating scheme such as
this result from the fact that judges do not know all the ratees, do not
know them equally well, and do not have equal confidence among themselves
as to the fineness of the discriminations they could make (number of rat-
ing units) among the ratees. Usual rating methods, however, cannot handle
gaps in the data well and require a consistent scale of measurement among
judges. As a consequence of these constrictions, considerable forcing of
the raters is resorted to. The raters or judges are forced to rate all
ratees using the same scale categories; sometimes judges are even required
to place an equal number of ratees in each category (to prevent them from
all piling up at the high end). Thus, the convenience of the investigator
is satisfied with unknown, but perhaps considerable, loss in the validity
of the ratings. That is, adding noise to a set of data, even if it is
done in a systematic way, does not always clarify the signal.
Pelz and Andrews (1966) and Andrews and Pelz (in preparation) des-
cribe how they were able to devise a program based on an earlier paper by
Ford in the American Mathematical Monthly. The Ford method allowed a judge
to eliminate those ratees he did not know, create as many rating categories
as he wished, and to place as many individuals as he desired in any one
category (but not more than one-third of all individuals being rated) . As
a result of the freedom permitted, the judges were able to space their sub-
jects over the categories they had created and could evaluate approximately
50 scientists on the two criteria in less than one hour without obvious
strain. This flexibility of their rating procedure was undoubtedly a major
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factor in the amount and usefulness of the data Pelz and Andrews were able
to obtain.
The Ford procedure is based on a win-loss matrix which shows the
probability that each ratee will be ranked above or below every other
ratee. Then, by an iterative process, weights are derived for each ratee
so that, when ratee-ratee comparisons are made using the weights, the
original matrix will be recaptured. Ordinal scaling (ranking) of the
weights then provide the ranking of each ratee. The program is written
in Fortran for an IBM 360/40 system and will handle up to 130 judges who
may use up to 130 ranked categories in evaluating up to 130 objects
(Andrews & Pelz, in preparation).
Dr. Maurice Apstein of the Harry Diamond Laboratories used a modi-
fied Pelz technique in which laboratories instead of individuals were
ranked by peers (Glass, 1969). The peers, or judges, were professional
technical people with considerable experience in R&D. The rankings were
made to serve as the criterion variable against which to evaluate the size
of the contract effort administered by a laboratory; that is, interest
was in determining the effect that the size of the contract effort admin-
istered by the laboratory had on the general overall excellence of the
laboratory.
The current DoD study (Glass, 1969) in this mold was initiated by
Mr. Evan D. Anderson of the Office for Laboratory Management, ODDR&E,
before his transfer to the Federal Commission on Procurement. The study
is much broader in size and scope than Apstein' s. There were 250 judges
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in the sample with up to 400 being planned for the ultimate sample. The
breakdown of judges was as follows:
(1) DoD laboratory directors
(2) R&D managers and technical specialists within the
Federal Government
(3) Industrial technical specialists, consultants and
professionals from nonprofit organizations
(4) Scientists and engineers in academic institutions
(5) Technical specialists in DoD program management and
system project offices
The larger number of judges permitted their assignment into the foregoing
categories for analysis of rankings. Accordingly, judgments of laboratories
could be made on rather specific performance factors in contrast to global
rankings of "technical competence." This permits a finer analysis of the
competence of the various laboratories and of particular interest are the
rankings of the customer's of the laboratories.
As with the Pelz and Andrews study and the Apstein study, the ob-
jective of the current DoD study is not simply a relative ranking of the
laboratories. Here again, the rankings—now available on different ranking
criteria--provide the basis, the dependent variable, the criterion against
which many factors relating to R&D management will be analyzed with the
ultimate purpose of achieving a better understanding of the R&D process in
order to administer it better.
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IV. INNOVATION IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENTS
There is little in the scientific literature on innovation in
R&D laboratories. Perhaps the reason for this is that scientists and
technical personnel are by the very nature of their professions assumed
to be innovative. Why do research on innovation among innovators?
According to Argyris (1968, p. 354),
There is, in short, almost nothing that can be said about
redesigning and changing research and development organi-
zations that is based upon empirical research and experi-
mentation within these types of organizations. It is
ironic but regrettably true that the very organizations
charged with research and innovation have been responsible
for generating little research and less innovation about
their own effectiveness.
Because of this situation, factors that might be important for innovation
within laboratories will be derived from a consideration of implementation
problems in reverse. That is, problems that arise in the implementation
of R&D products in user organizations often involve innovations in tech-
niques, procedures, and/or materiel. Innovations within a R&D laboratory,
then, might be considered a special case of implementation in which the
innovation is developed elsewhere and brought into the laboratory (even
though the innovation might have been developed by the laboratory, itself).
The problems of implementation associated with innovative items
can be studied from several approaches and to varying depths of detail.
Mecherikoff and Mackie (1970) analyzed the problem of acceptance of inno-
vations in the Navy as a problem in attitude change. A review of the ex-
tensive literature on attitude change, a major area of personality and
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social psychology, did not provide them with concrete answers or handy
tools for overcoming negative attitudes toward innovations. While their
study is couched in the technical terminology of attitude change, their
structuring of the problem and recommendations—based on case studies as
well as the literature review—is essentially a tract on salesmanship.
So while their recommendations—actually guidance—regarding appropriate
procedures seem to be fundamentally sound, they, like principles of sales-
manship, are probably only as good as the skill of the salesman (the change
advocate) in any particular situation.
The factors involved in attitude change regarding an innovation
are listed by them as involving at least the following: (1) The person
advocating the change, (2) the communication or message that accompanies
the effort, (3) the group factors which affect an individual's propensity
for change, (4) individual characteristics that result in different re-
sponses to innovative efforts, and (5) situational factors. Any one of
these factors can take on many values, and there are complex interactions
among them. Accordingly, any specific occurrence of an innovation problem
may have an infinite number of alternative courses that the attitude change
process might take. Because of the impossibility of placing probabilities
on these alternative courses with any degree of confidence, an approach
that attempts to break down the innovation problem into such fragmented
detail does not have practical applications. The approach, of course, may
have considerable heuristic value.
Those involved in the Northwestern University Program of Research
on the Management of Research and Development have taken a more molar
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approach to the implementation of R&D products (Radnor, Rubenstein, &
Tansik, 1970). Considering the implementation problem as a special case
of the general phase-transition process in R&D, they reach essentially
the same impasse as Mecherikoff and Mackie. They state that "Many new
products, product lines, and technologies fail initially, and sometimes
remain failures, because of the inability of the organization and its
members to adapt their attitudes and behavior in a manner required by
the new venture" (Radnor, Rubenstein, & Tansik, 1970, p. 969). They list
the following factors that underly implementation problems in the R&D
environment (Radnor, et. al
.
, 1970, p. 971):
1. Recognition of the need for an item.
2. Willingness of the individuals in the receiving unit
to interrupt ongoing work to handle something new.
3. Technical mismatch in understanding of the specifica-
tions of the item.
4. Mismatch in understanding of objectives of the project
or task.
5. Pre-existing relations of trust or confidence between
the parties to an implementation transaction.




10. Level of managerial support.
11. Point in time at which a management committment is
made to the project—i.e., the decision to set up a
formal project mechanism.
Their model of the phase-transition process that is implementation is
more specific and worked out in fuller detail compared with the large
"black box" diagrams of Mecherikoff and Mackie. Nevertheless, it is still
a theoretical model of the process and not a practical, workable tool.
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Following their critical review of the implementation problem,
they list some methods that have been reportedly successful in implemen-
tation, but warn that they have been used in projects that have failed,
too. The methods are (Radnor, et. al . , 1970, p. 989):
1. Assuring that there is a clear and recognized need
for the results at the time the project is undertaken.
2. Involvement of the ultimate user of the results early
in the process, and maintaining communication through-
out the project.
3. Focus of the direction or strategy for the project in
an individual or a small group that can review and make
decisions about changes in direction or level of effort,
4. Having top management support and enthusiasm.
5. Allowing or encouraging researchers to follow projects
into application and make careers there, if they so
desire.
They conclude, from the wide diversity of methods used and the lack of
consistent cause-effect relations between methods used and project success,
that much more research is needed in the area before there will be a rea-
sonable theory of implementation, let alone a handbook or set of algorithms
for carrying out implementation. Carried over into the implementation of
innovations within an R&D laboratory, an even stronger conclusion can be
made: there are no administrative and managerial practices that are guar-
anteed to succeed.
What, then, could management do to bring innovations into the lab-
oratory with at least some modicum of success? In the first place, the
guidance that can be gained from a study and application of principles
developed in documents, such as those cited in the discussion above, should
not be ignored. But there would seem to be a lesson that can be obtained
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from the two lists provided by Radnor et_. al. that is especially appro-
priate for R&D management. If we remember that the implementation prob-
lem as discussed arises from the user environment, the picture may not
be so bleak in the R&D environment. That is, implementation in reverse
is not exactly the same as implementation in the forward direction because
innovation in the R&D environment is the accepted way of life and the path
to success. It is administered out of the environment by the dysfunctional
control processes so aptly described by Argyris. Innovation in the labora-
tory should, then, follow as a direct result of good administration of the
laboratory that creates in its individual members a need for innovation,
the willingness to give time and effort to it, an involvement in innovative
projects, a feeling of a sense of urgency for the development and use of
innovative approaches, and an opportunity to cash in on successful appli-
cation of innovative techniques and procedures. These factors, taken from
the Radnor, e_t. a_l. lists, are but a specific example of the characteristics
of positive laboratory pressures described earlier from the works of Hall
and Lawler: quality, time, and financial responsibility pressures and a
deep sense of involvement in the total life framework of the laboratory.
As shown by Merchikoff and Mackie, the pressure points where action could
be taken to accomplish these ends are the individual participant and the
group and situational factors. Referred to the laboratory environment,
these are precisely the dimensions of the scientist-laboratory interface
shown in figure 2 and described in section II c, above. The problem for
the laboratory manager is to determine which of • the many interfaces, when
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properly manipulated, will provide the most payoff in the direction de-
sired. An approach that may solve this problem satisfactorily in the




A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EFFECTIVENESS EVALUATION
It is known that the usual management procedures for ensuring ade-
quate performance of a laboratory, such as coordinating conferences, reports,
person-to-person contacts, and so forth, are fully used in the management
of the Navy's personnel research laboratories. Further elaboration of this
area as a means for effectiveness evaluation is not contemplated.
From the preceding discussion involving the use of advisory panels
to evaluate the quality and effectiveness of a laboratory, it is recommended
that such a panel or panels be established. The purpose of such a panel
should be to assess the health of current programs; the quality of personnel
and the techniques being employed; the relevance and meaningfulness of the
total program configuration of the laboratories; and methods being employed
to upgrade facilities, skills, and capabilities. The panel should include
technical personnel and representatives of consumer organizations, as in
the case of the panel for the current DoD peer rating effort in view of the
broad spectrum of projects worked on in the laboratories. The reporting
level will probably be at the Bureau of Naval Personnel level, but the ac-
tivities of the panel should emphasize interactions with personnel at the
laboratory level to ensure a feeling of participatory management on the part
of the laboratory people. It would seem advisable to have a subpanel or
another panel at the laboratory director's level that is composed strictly
of technical personnel to provide advice and guidance to the laboratory as
requested.
1. While this' study was in progress, a Laboratory Advisory Board for
Personnel Laboratories has been established under the aegis of the Naval
Research Advisory Committee (NRAC) . The primary purpose of the advisory
board is to provide NRAC background information for its advice on Navy RDT&E
matters to the Assistant Secretary of Navy (R&D). Its specific areas of
evaluation are similar to those discussed here. The members are all tech-
nical personnel under the chairmanship of Dr. Joseph W. Rigney , Department
of Psychology, University of Southern California.
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In the case of individual laboratories, some estimate of the quality
or effectiveness of its products—rather than the laboratory as an institu-
tion— is desired. Currently, the formal reports of the laboratories are
accompanied by an "Evaluation of Report" form which requests the reader to
evaluate the report and mail in the evaluation form. A similar form exists
for end-product evaluations that are not in the formal report series. The
report evaluation asks the reviewer to rate the report as low, average, or
high on several categories which are related to usefulness, timeliness,
accuracy, and format factors. In addition, open-ended questions and room
for comments are provided. The questions also emphasize an evaluation of
the usefulness of the report and the usefulness of the laboratory's products.
Unfortunately, the return rate of the forms is essentially nil. A similar
form was in use by the US Air Forces Human Resources Laboratory, with the
same result. The latter has been discontinued.
It is suggested that the Pelz-Andrews technique be modified and
applied to the laboratory's products as the rated items in lieu of individ-
ual professionals or individual laboratories. The products could be rated
at the program (task area) level or at the level of formal reports that are
terminal, comprehensive reports of a project. Probably the latter would
present a problem in selection or a problem in too many products for evalua-
tion. The decision would have to be worked out with the personnel R&D
management structure. It is further suggested that the panels be of two
distinct types. A type-one panel would be composed of technical personnel
from the user agencies who could be expected to be familiar with the products
of the laboratories. This would provide the all-important consumer appraisal
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of a laboratory's products. A type-two panel would be composed of only
technical/professional personnel from the laboratory. This would provide
the important factor of laboratory participation in the evaluation process, and
indirectly a voice in the laboratory's R&D program. The technical panel
could be supplemented by personnel from outside the laboratory who are fa-
miliar with its products to provide another facet to the evaluation. All
of the panels would not need to be implemented. The consumer panel would
probably provide management with the most useful information with respect
to effectiveness. The in-house, type-two panel would be the easiest to
implement
.
The criteria for the ratings would be different for the two panels.
The type-one panel would use two criteria which could be called (1) use-
fulness and (2) influence. The usefulness criterion would include the
area of evaluation portrayed on the Evaluation of Report form and would
emphasize short-term, direct applications of the product. Included in the
criterion would be factors such as usefulness, timeliness, completeness,
accuracy, adequacy of data, adequacy of approach, convenience of format.
The specific wording of the criterion would be worked out with personnel
research, management personnel. The second criterion, dealing with the
influence of the report, will emphasize its long-term usefulness according
to its potential influence on concepts, planning, and decision-making in
the user agencies.
The criteria for the type-two panel would also number two: (1) tech-
nical-scientific value and (2) mission appropriateness. The first criter-
ion would be similar to that used by Pelz and Andrews regarding the work of
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individual scientists. The product would be rated for its value in con-
tributing to knowledge in the field and especially its value in furthering
the work of the laboratory. The second criterion would permit the labora-
tory personnel to express their thoughts on what the laboratory should be
doing, considering its general mission. In other words, the panel would
rate its programs as most appropriate or representative of what the mission
calls for. The mission statements, as of this writing, are those in DDR&E
Management Analysis Report, MAR 70-4 (pages 87 and 95).
The method of analysis would involve the use of the University of
Michigan program, available from the Survey Research Center, for the Ford
analysis. The derived weights for the products analyzed could serve as
the dependent variable for further analyses based on characteristics of
the raters and of the rated items. Such analyses would provide a fuller
understanding of what factors constitute the effective and noneffective
products or programs of the laboratories. They would also provide input
for managerial and administrative practices to enhance the implementation
of innovative techniques and procedures.
A difficult problem in carrying out the recommended ratings would
be an appropriate definition of the "consumer" for a type I panel. Because
of the diversification of the areas of specialization of the Navy's per-
sonnel research laboratories, potential customers will not be a homogenous
group. Accordingly, rankings obtained through a type I panel will reflect
the constitution of the panel. In addition, there may be an insufficient
commonality of items rated to provide a reliable ranking over a majority
-55-
of the items. In the extreme case, each of a few judges may rate completely
different items, for example. Probably the best way to overcome these po-
tential problem areas would be to use many raters (as in the DoD laboratory
study mentioned previously). But here, practical considerations and the
limited number of potential raters may present other problems. In the final
analysis, however, the rankings by a type I panel constitute a managerial
tool for providing needed information, and any bias in the constitution of
the rater sample should reflect the desires and purposes of management in
conducting the ratings.
The procedure of evaluating laboratory products by peer ratings
could be done at periodic intervals, say approximately three years, to main-
tain a feel for the quality and effectiveness of the laboratory's work.
As long-range programs, it is recommended that studies be initiated
to determine how to assess the contribution of personnel research laboratory
products to total system effectiveness and how to use implementation as a
criterion to evaluate effectiveness of the laboratory's output.
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INNOVATION IMPLEMENTATION
Interviews at the Navy's personnel research laboratories indicate
that many specific attempts to upgrade the professional excellence of the
laboratory are being made. They include the procurement of outside speakers,
tutorials on specific techniques, attendance at professional meetings,
bringing in specially qualified reserve officers for their "summer tours,"
sponsoring symposia, attendance at short courses, and the other commonly
used procedures. In one instance, for example, the developers of the auto-
mated operational sequence diagramming technique at San Diego went to the
Washington laboratory to put on a tutorial on the method. The effects of
these attempts is not known but assumed to be beneficial. (The usual case.)
It was concluded in the section on innovation (section IV D) that
innovation in the laboratory is a problem in manipulating the appropriate
variables in the scientist-laboratory interface to bring about the climate
that would, of itself, create a motivation for innovation. Then, any
specific innovative attempt or project would have a greater chance of succeed-
ing. The problem lies in deciding which set of variables to manipulate.
In order to determine what set of variables to manipulate, one
must know the important interactions and their outcomes of the input and
process variables shown in figure 2. A comprehensive study showing impor-
tant relationships of this type is the Pelz-Andrews monograph previously
referred to on many occasions. A simple way to answer the question of what
to do lies in obtaining measurements on the important variables of the Pelz-
Andrews study for a particular laboratory and then going to the study to
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determine what manipulations will produce the desired climate. For example,
if one group of PhD scientists turned up in a predominantly research-ori-
ented work unit in which the decision controls for any one person were very
few, he would find from the Pelz-Andrews monograph that having four decision-
controls (decreasing freedom!) resulted in a higher volume and quality of
output for such scientists. The indicated action is obvious.
Such an approach could be taken at several levels of complexity with
respect to data collection. A level-one analysis (simple date collection)
would use the following variables:
Individual variables: Age; education; time since BA/S, MA/S,
PhD; and area of specialization.
Work unit variables: Identification of unit, size, predomi-
nant orientation.
The combination of the individual variables with the work-unit variables
will lead to many practical management procedures for moving the climate
toward greater effectiveness of the work unit, including implementation of
innovative methods. The value for these variables could be obtained from
individual records, organizational charts, and unit charters. In addition,
management could provide estimates as to some of the control variables
that might apply to the work units, thus enrichening the analysis. If the
laboratory products evaluated in the peer ratings can be traced by source
to the work units, the relationship of work-unit characteristics to quality
of output could be analyzed using a multivariate procedure described below.
A more complex level of analysis would involve the creation of
appropriate questionnaires to obtain data from individual scientists in the
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laboratories . Of particular interest would be the obtaining of additional
dependent measures for multivariate analyses. These would be the number
of papers published and presentations made in a specified period of time
and the number of laboratory reports authored/coauthored in that period.
Again, it would be desirable to identify the work unit and the individual
with specific products or program areas that have been peer rated. Multi-
variate analyses of the input and process variables using the peer ratings
and individual production as the dependent variables would provide a rich
picture of the factors within the laboratory associated with effective and
noneffective individuals and work units. A multivariate technique, Multiple
Classification Analysis, has been obtained from the Survey Research Center
that is particularly adaptable to this analysis (Andrews, Morgan & Sonquist,
1969). This technique and the computer program listed were used for the
analyses in the Pelz and Andrews study of scientists in organizations.
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